Discussion:
Capability integrity and application identity
mark ll
2016-01-20 12:15:47 UTC
Permalink
Hi Genode!
I have 2 question. 
is there any mechanism to ensure the integrity of a capability?
i read in the book about the identity but it is still not clear to me.  could i use this  identity to authenticate the connection between tow application in my platform or even in remote one instead of the port or IP.
best.  
mark ll
2016-01-20 13:18:22 UTC
Permalink
Hi Genode !
I have 2 questions. 
is there any mechanism to ensure the integrity of a capability?
i read in the book about the identity but it is still not clear to me.  could i use this  identity to authenticate the connection between tow application in my platform or even in remote one instead of the port or IP address.
best.  
Norman Feske
2016-01-20 14:11:52 UTC
Permalink
Hello Mark,

welcome to the mailing list!
Post by mark ll
is there any mechanism to ensure the integrity of a capability?
The integrity of capabilities is protected if the underlying kernel
supports this. This is the case for base-hw, base-nova, base-foc, and
base-sel4 (a few corner cases notwithstanding). On base-linux and the
traditional L4 kernels, capabilities remain unprotected. Here a
capability is represented by a plain number, which can naturally be forged.

On kernels with capability support, each capability is represented by a
distinct kernel object. Even though the user land can create those
objects, it has no means to manipulate those kernel objects directly. A
kernel object can be manipulated only via the kernel interface (e.g., by
telling the kernel to delegate a capability to another protection
domain). The kernel ensures that all its operations preserve the
integrity of the capabilities.
Post by mark ll
i read in the book about the identity but it is still not clear to me.
could i use this identity to authenticate the connection between tow
application in my platform or even in remote one instead of the port or
IP address.
No. As Genode capabilities are protected by the underlying kernel (at
best), the protection is limited to the bounds of the machine the kernel
is running on.

Cheers
Norman
--
Dr.-Ing. Norman Feske
Genode Labs

http://www.genode-labs.com · http://genode.org

Genode Labs GmbH · Amtsgericht Dresden · HRB 28424 · Sitz Dresden
Geschäftsführer: Dr.-Ing. Norman Feske, Christian Helmuth
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